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federal level and ensure that their clients comply with the law. The compliance requirement, however, is not limited to the issuer clients. Defrauded investors will often seek recovery of their losses from both the issuer of
the failed investment securities and from the lawyers who represent the
issuer, which only exacerbates the complexity of the securities lawyer’s
work. These securities fraud actions against lawyers raise serious questions about the proper scope of liability under the federal securities laws.
Just as lawyers strive for clarity, consistency, and predictability in advising
their clients on securities compliance issues, lawyers seek the same level of
precision regarding their own compliance.
Analysis of the legal questions in this area begins with the relevant
federal statute. The stated purpose for the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (34 Act) is to regulate and control transactions in securities, “to impose requirements necessary to make such regulation and control reasonably complete and effective, . . . and to insure the maintenance of fair and
honest markets in [securities] transactions . . . .”1 In addition to providing
for the compensation of defrauded investors, the 34 Act seeks to deter and
prevent fraud in the securities markets and to ensure that all information
relevant to an investment decision is fully and completely disclosed.2 In
recognition of this broad objective, the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized that the securities laws must not be interpreted
“‘technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial
purposes.’”3 A competing but equally important principle is that the 34
Act should not be read to restrict conduct or to apply to a particular individual’s conduct in a manner that is inconsistent with the statutory language or the overall statutory scheme.4
The Court has rejected the notion of aiding and abetting liability in a
private action under the federal securities laws.5 Thus, secondary actors,
such as lawyers, accountants, banks, and mutual fund investment advisers,
are civilly liable under section 10(b) of the 34 Act6 and its corresponding
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule, Rule 10b-5,7 only when

1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
2. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986).
3. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653 (1988) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 151 (1972)).
4. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980).
5. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177, 191
(1994).
6. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). Section 10(b) provides, in
pertinent part, as follows: “It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . (b) To use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device . . . .” Id.
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). Rule 10b-5 provides:
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such persons or entities have satisfied the requirements for primary liability. However, the distinction between conduct that satisfies the requirements for an actionable primary violation and conduct that is nonactionable aiding and abetting is not entirely clear. The confusion creates
problems for attorneys who provide advice and guidance to issuers because
of the extent that attorneys are involved in the preparation of various disclosure documents and other types of documents that are produced in connection with the issuance and sale of securities.
The Court has never directly addressed the issue of attorney liability
under section 10(b) of the 34 Act and Rule 10b-5. However, the Court’s
recent pronouncements on primary liability of secondary actors under Rule
10b-5 indicate that the standard for such liability is increasingly becoming
one that attorneys acting in the traditional role of adviser and draftsperson
to securities issuers will not satisfy.8 This development does not give lawyers unbridled freedom or authority to commit securities fraud without fear
of sanction, nor does it undermine the 34 Act’s purpose of insuring fairness
and honesty in the securities markets. On the contrary, protecting lawyers
who lend their expertise to the issuers and sellers of securities is consistent
with insuring such fairness and honesty. Moreover, existing rules and
standards governing attorney conduct and the concomitant penalties for
violation of those rules provide the appropriate level of regulation for lawyers,9 and this article does not suggest otherwise. The article argues only

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
8. See Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 (2011) (holding
that a mutual fund’s investment adviser was not liable under Rule 10b-5 for false statements in the
mutual fund’s prospectuses because the investment adviser did not make the material misstatements in
the prospectuses within the meaning of Rule 10b-5); Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP,
603 F.3d 144, 148, 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied., 131 S. Ct. 3021 (2011) (denial of certiorari
from Circuit Court decision holding that a law firm was not liable under Rule 10b-5 for false statements
that the attorneys allegedly created where the false statements were not attributed to the lawyers at the
time of dissemination).
9. See Marianne C. Adams, Note, Breaking Past the Parallax: Finding the True Place of Lawyers
in Securities Fraud, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 958–61 (2010) (discussion of the “panoply of rules
and guiding principles” applicable to lawyers that impose “a fairly high level of professional ethical
expectations”). In addition to the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the
SEC has adopted rules that articulate standards of conduct for attorneys who represent issuers and
practice before the SEC. 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1–205.7 (2009) (defining the standards of professional
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that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are inappropriate and, in most cases,
inapposite means of redressing attorney misconduct in connection with a
fraudulent securities transaction.
Part II of this article will provide some background on section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 and will discuss how section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have
been applied in the area of liability of outside service providers such as
lawyers and other secondary actors.10 In addition, part II will review the
most recent developments of the law in this area and discuss how these
developments provide an increased level of protection for securities lawyers. Part III of this article will examine how other areas of federal and
state law have addressed the issue of attorney liability and suggest that the
concepts can be applied to the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 analysis.11
Part IV will briefly discuss the role of the securities lawyer and the influence of the market for legal services on the manner in which these lawyers
sell their services to potential clients.12 The article will then argue that the
potential liability of any person under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must
be defined in terms of conduct and not in terms of the person’s role in the
particular transaction giving rise to the claim. 13 That framework will permit the securities lawyer to more effectively fulfill his or her role because
the standard for attorney liability in a private action under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 will be clearer.
II. SCOPE OF SECTION 10(B) OF THE 34 ACT AND RULE 10B-5
A. General Background of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
It is fairly common knowledge that Congress set out to regulate the securities industry in response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the unrestrained conduct in the industry that caused the crash.14 The 34 Act is
focused primarily on regulating the trading of securities on the various
exchanges and markets after the initial distribution of the securities.15 The
accompanying piece of legislation that Congress passed during the same
era, the Securities Act of 1933 (33 Act),16 regulates the initial distribution
conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the commission in the representation of an issuer). Attorneys who violate the SEC rules are subject to sanctions and discipline. Id. at § 205.6.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 14–220.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 221–73.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 274–280.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 281–87.
14. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 170–71 (1994).
15. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).
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of securities by requiring detailed disclosures in registration statements and
prospectuses as a means of preventing unduly aggressive sales tactics and
overpriced securities issuances.17 Both the 34 Act and the 33 Act contain
provisions designed to prevent fraud in the securities markets, but section
10(b) of the 34 Act is the most familiar of these antifraud provisions.18
Section 10(b) of the 34 Act makes it unlawful to use manipulation or
deception “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security” insofar
as such conduct is “in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”19 In
1942, the SEC utilized its rulemaking authority set forth in section 10(b) to
adopt Rule 10b-520 which prohibits fraudulent or misleading conduct in
buying and selling securities in the most general sense.21 The text of section 10(b) is silent on whether private individuals may bring a cause of
action, but the Court has found an implied right of action in the statute and,
more directly, in Rule 10b-5.22 A plaintiff who brings a private action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must establish each of the following:
“(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or
omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”23
The reliance requirement, which is also known as transaction causation, establishes that but for the deceptive act or fraudulent misrepresentation or omission, the investor would not have engaged in the particular
17. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 171; Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 727–28, 752–53. But see
Therese H. Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 for Fraudulent Trading in Postdistribution Markets, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 847, 872–75 (1991) (arguing that Congress
may have intended the protections of the 33 Act to apply to transactions in the post distribution trading
markets because it is unclear whether Congress knew for certain at the time of adoption of the 33 Act
that it would adopt the 34 Act to address the issue of fraud in these markets).
18. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 171; see Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities
Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 66 (2009) (“At the forefront of [the antifraud] measures [in the federal
securities laws] was § 10(b) of the 34 Securities Exchange Act.”). One commentator has described
section 10(b) as “a catchall provision, . . . the most open-ended and the most important [of the antifraud
measures in the federal securities laws].” ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 8.9, at 309 (1986);
see also Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970) (“All that [Rule 10b-5] requires for its
violation is that someone ‘do something bad’ in connection with a purchase or sale of securities.”
(quoting RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 961 (2d ed. 1968)).
19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
20. See supra note 7 for the text of Rule 10b-5.
21. “When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn.” Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737.
22. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008); see Colombo, supra note 18, at 66 (individuals do not violate § 10(b) directly but only derivatively through conduct that contravenes Rule 10b-5).
23. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, 552 U.S. at 157 (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S.
336, 341–42 (2005)).
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securities transaction.24 The reliance requirement is perhaps the best way
to understand the concept of attorney liability under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 and to draw appropriate boundaries by obligating a Rule 10b-5
plaintiff to establish explicit attribution of the statement to the defendant as
part of the reliance inquiry. Because of the nature of the work that securities lawyers do for issuers,25 a section 10(b) plaintiff will almost never be
able to satisfy the reliance element of a claim against a lawyer. The requirement that a statement be explicitly attributed to a secondary actor in
order to establish the reliance element for a primary action under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-526 provides the appropriate degree of protection for
securities lawyers27 and permits them to work effectively on behalf of their
clients.
B. Liability of Secondary Actors
1. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A.
In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,28 the
United States Supreme Court declined to impose civil liability on those
who aid and abet a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.29 The decision in Central Bank was somewhat unexpected because of the large volume of existing federal case law recognizing civil liability for aiders and
abettors under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.30 The Court’s exclusive reli24. Id. at 171; In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 631 (3d Cir. 2011).
25. See ROBERT J. HAFT AND MICHELE H. HUDSON, LIABILITY OF ATTORNEYS AND ACCOUNTANTS
FOR SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS § 3:2 (Westlaw Database Updated May 2010) (“[T]he attorney’s role
usually consists of advising on disclosure issues and often (but not always) drafting, for the client’s
consideration and modification, the offering documents to be issued in final form under the client’s (not
attorney’s) name . . . .”); Scott M. Herpich, Relying on Client-Supplied Information: An Attorney’s
Liability Exposure Under Rule 10b-5, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 661–62 (1995) (breaking down the role of
the securities lawyer into three distinct levels of attorney action: reviewing and revising client prepared
documents, preparing and drafting documents, and drafting opinion letters, and analyzing each one in
terms of the attorney’s potential liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
26. Affco Invs. 2001, L.L.C. v. Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., 625 F.3d 185, 193–95 (5th Cir. 2010); Pac.
Inv. Mgmt., Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 3021 (2011); Wilson v. Dalene, 699 F. Supp. 2d 534, 548 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
27. But see Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Primary Liability of Securities Lawyers, 50 SMU L.
REV. 383, 386-87 (1996) (arguing that securities lawyers involved in securities offerings are essential
participants in such offerings and that lawyer misconduct in conjunction with fraudulent securities
transactions arises in situations that satisfy the required elements for a primary violation of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
28. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
29. Id. at 177, 191.
30. Richard C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 BUS. LAW. 1135, 1141 & n.32
(2006) (citing cases). Moreover, the primary focus of the decision was on the statutory language of §
10(b) of the 34 Act, and the opinion did not specify the extent to which it applied to Rule 10b-5 or to a
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ance on the statutory language of section 10(b) led it to the conclusion that
the statute applies only to persons who make material misstatements or
omissions or who engage in manipulative or deceptive conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of a security and not to those who aid and
abet such persons.31
The Central Bank of Denver was the indenture trustee for a public issue of bonds by the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority to finance improvements at a residential and commercial development.32 The bond covenants required that the land securing the bonds be
worth at least 160% of the bonds’ outstanding principal and interest.33 The
real estate developer was required to provide the Central Bank of Denver
with an annual report to verify that the 160% test was satisfied.34
In January 1988, the developer provided the Central Bank of Denver
with an appraisal showing that the land values had remained virtually constant since the 1986 appraisal.35 Soon after it received this appraisal, the
Central Bank of Denver received a letter from the senior underwriter of the
bond issue.36 The underwriter noted that property values in the area were
declining and that the appraisal was not up-to-date and expressed concern
that the 160% test was not being met.37 Central Bank of Denver’s in house
appraiser agreed that the values in the 1986 appraisal appeared optimistic
particular subsection of Rule 10b-5. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 170 (1994) (stating that grant of certiorari was “to resolve the continuing confusion
over the existence and scope of the § 10(b) aiding and abetting action.”). In fact, the Court viewed the
case as an occasion to determine the range of prohibited conduct under section 10(b), and it relied
primarily on the text of the statute to make that determination. Id. at 172–73.
Even though the courts recognized civil aiding and abetting claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
prior to Central Bank, the standard for imposition of liability on lawyers under this theory was quite
high. See Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1127–28 (5th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 aiding and abetting claim against a law firm that assisted in preparation of an
offering statement for a bond offering where the law firm lacked the requisite intent to violate the
securities laws); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 492, 495–97 (7th Cir.
1986) (rejecting the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 aiding and abetting claim against a law firm that had
advised a bond issuer whose materials for selling the bonds lacked essential information where the law
firm did not act with intent to deceive any of the bonds’ purchasers and did not intentionally or recklessly give bad advice to the bond issuer). See infra notes 244–46 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion of the Abell case.
31. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177–78. The Central Bank court distinguished a primary violation of
section 10(b) from an aiding and abetting violation based on the “critical element” of the defendant’s
representation, “either by statement or omission,” and the plaintiff’s reliance on that representation.
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff who relies only on the
representation of a person providing substantial assistance to the defendant who is engaged in the
primary violation cannot impose liability on such person. Id.
32. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 167.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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and advised the bank to hire an outside appraiser to conduct an independent review of the 1988 appraisal.38
An exchange of correspondence then took place between the developer
and the Central Bank of Denver, and the bank agreed to delay the independent review of the appraisal until the end of the year, which was six
months after the bond issue closed in June 1988.39 However, before the
outside appraiser completed its independent review, the public building

authority defaulted on the bonds.40 First Interstate Bank of Denver
had purchased a substantial portion of the bonds and brought a section 10(b) action after the default against, among others, the Central
Bank of Denver, alleging that the bank was secondarily liable under
section 10(b) for aiding and abetting the fraud.41
In resolving the issue before it, the Court engendered further debate
surrounding the liability of lawyers and other secondary actors under the
federal securities laws. The source of much of that debate was language
near the end of the Central Bank opinion regarding the liability of secondary actors. The language immediately followed the Court’s statement of
the holding in the case, which is that a private plaintiff is prohibited from
bringing an action for aiding and abetting under section 10(b), and it is
quoted in its entirety here:
The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not
mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always
free from liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity,
including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on
which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a
primary violator under 10b–5, assuming all of the requirements for
primary liability under Rule 10b–5 are met. In any complex securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators . . .42
The Court said nothing more about the standard for liability for these
secondary actors other than to make clear that such actors are liable if they
commit a section 10(b) violation. The Court was simply clarifying that
any person, including a secondary actor, may face liability under section
10(b) if such person engages in conduct that satisfies the requirements for a
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Cent. Bank, 511 U.S.at 167–68.
Id. at 168.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 191 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

File: Bishop Article

2012

Created on: 12/4/2012 8:30:00 PM

Last Printed: 12/11/2012 3:04:00 AM

ATTORNEY LIABILITY UNDER 10(B) AND RULE 10(B)-5

201

primary violation. In determining whether section 10(b) applies to a particular situation, the focus must be on whether the conduct satisfies the
elements of a section 10(b) claim and not on the classification of the person whose conduct is at issue. Elimination of the phrase “including a lawyer, accountant, or bank” from this oft quoted passage from Central Bank
reduces it to the very noncontroversial proposition that any person who
satisfies all of the requirements for a Rule 10b-5 violation is liable for a
Rule 10b-5 violation.
Courts, commentators, and securities lawyers have attempted to decipher the meaning of this language from Central Bank as they have addressed whether lawyers, accountants, underwriters, and other secondary
actors may be held primarily liable under section 10(b).43 Even though the
statement can fairly be read as a clarifying point on the court’s holding,
which is that the rejection of aiding and abetting liability under section
10(b) does not provide secondary actors with an outright exemption from
section 10(b) primary liability, it has also generated some discussion as to
the proper standard for liability of secondary actors under section 10(b).44
As one commentator has pointed out, the plaintiffs in Central Bank
sought to hold the Central Bank of Denver liable for violating section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 based solely on an aiding and abetting theory and never
asserted that the Central Bank of Denver met the standard for a primary
violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.45 An assertion of a primary
violation may have required the Court to consider the issue of scheme liability.46 That issue came squarely before the court in Stoneridge Invest-

43. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 3021 (June 20, 2011); Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 6–7, Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144 (2d Cir.
2010) (No. 09-1619-cv), 2009 WL 7768584 at *6–7; Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities
Litigation: In Search of Liability Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1294
(1999) (describing the Court’s observation about the imposition of primary liability on secondary actors
as “somewhat cryptic” and lacking guidance); Ann Maxey, Competing Duties? Securities Lawyers’
Liability after Central Bank, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2185, 2210 (1996) (noting that Central Bank does
not offer courts very much assistance in distinguishing between a lawyer’s act that constitutes a primary violation of Rule 10b-5 and an act that does not rise to that level).
44. See Joanna B. Apolinsky, Is There Any Viability to Scheme Liability for Secondary Actors After
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.?, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 411, 425 (2009) (“Although repudiating aiding and abetting liability, the Central Bank decision provided scant guidance for
determining when a secondary actor had merely aided or abetted another’s fraud, as opposed to having
engaged in fraud itself.”); Adams, supra note 9, at 965–66 (questioning whether Central Bank’s prohibition on aiding and abetting liability served the purpose of protecting those who do not commit section
10(b) violations but only give aid to those who do).
45. Colombo, supra note 18, at 119.
46. Id.; see Taavi Annus, Note, Scheme Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 72 MO. L. REV. 855, 861–62 (2007) (discussing scheme liability’s rise to prominence when
Central Bank foreclosed aiding and abetting claims).
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ment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.47 The Stoneridge discussion
will be more instructive if it is preceded by a brief discussion of the law
after Central Bank and leading up to Stoneridge.
2. Liability of Secondary Actors After Central Bank
Two lines of cases developed after Central Bank. One line of cases
adopted the substantial participation test, which states that third parties
may be liable for statements made by others in which the defendant had
significant participation or intricate involvement.48 The factual scenarios
in which liability is imposed under the substantial participation test illustrate that the conduct of the defendants in those cases really amounts to
aiding and abetting and nothing more.49 The substantial participation test
is an example of the confusion that grew out of the pronouncement in Central Bank about liability of secondary actors such as lawyers and accountants under the federal securities laws:50
[W]ithout a clearer definition and a narrowing of the kind of conduct and circumstances required to constitute “substantial participation” or “intricate involvement,” the substantial participation test
may fail to differentiate between primary liability and aiding and
abetting, or even unrestricted conspiracy, and . . . the area of overlap may be significant under such an expansive test.51
The second line of cases adopted the bright line test, which provides
that a third party’s review and approval of documents containing fraudu47. 552 U.S. 148 (2008). The Court in Stoneridge also confirmed the validity of the language in
Central Bank regarding section 10(b) liability of secondary actors for primary violations when it stated
that “the implied right of action in section 10(b) continues to cover secondary actors who commit
primary violations.” Id. at 166 (citing Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191).
48. E.g., Dannenberg v. Painewebber Inc. (In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 50 F.3d 615,
628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (ruling that an accounting firm could be primarily liable under section 10(b) for
the contents of a letter submitted to the SEC where it “played a significant role in drafting and editing
the . . . letter” and that the decision in Central Bank did not protect the accounting firm from liability),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 907 (1995); Carley Capital Grp. v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d
1324, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (holding that “a secondary actor can be primarily liable when it, acting
alone or with others, creates a misrepresentation even if the misrepresentation is not publicly attributed
to it”); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (ruling that the plaintiffs
submitted sufficient evidence to suggest that an accounting firm’s participation in the creation of certain public statements was sufficiently extensive to attribute those misstatements and omissions to the
accounting firm and thereby to establish that the accounting firm’s conduct was a direct violation of
Rule 10b-5).
49. But see Travis S. Souza, Note, Freedom to Defraud: Stoneridge, Primary Liability, and the Need
to Properly Define Section 10(b), 57 DUKE L.J. 1179, 1187 (2008) (arguing that the substantial participation test is a more accurate determination than the bright line test of whether a person has made an
untrue statement for Rule 10b-5 purposes).
50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 585 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
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lent statements is not actionable under section 10(b) because one must
make the material misstatements or omission in order to be a primary violator.52 In most adaptations of the bright line test, it also requires proof that
the allegedly misleading statement was made by and attributed at the time
of its issuance to the defendant being sued.53 In addition to being easier for
compliance and application purposes, the bright line test anticipated the
later emphasis on attribution as an essential component of the reliance element of a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 action. The bright line test is also
more consistent with the reasoning of Central Bank and assesses liability
based on the alleged offender’s conduct and not his or her occupation.
A third rule for primary liability of a secondary party under section
10(b), which was proposed by the SEC in connection with the Enron litigation54 and numerous other cases,55 provides that when a person, acting
alone or with others, creates a misrepresentation on which an investorplaintiff relies, the person can be liable as a primary violator of section
10(b) if he or she acts with the requisite scienter. Under this test, a person
could be liable as a primary violator even though the person is not publicly
associated with the misstatement that he or she created.56 Thus, it does not
require attribution and is really a slightly more restricted formulation of the
substantial participation test.
C. Reliance, Attribution, and Narrowly Defining the Maker of a Statement
The three decisions that are discussed in this section are the cornerstones of the current state of the law regarding the liability of secondary
52. E.g., Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205–07 (11th Cir. 2001) (ruling that primary liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires the alleged misstatement or omission upon
which the plaintiff relied to have been “publicly attributable to the defendant at the time that the plaintiff’s investment decision was made”); Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 174–75 (2d Cir.
1998) (ruling that a person does not incur primary liability under section 10(b) unless the person makes
the material misstatement or omission, which must be directly attributed to the maker at the time of
dissemination), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999); Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720–21 (2d Cir.
1997) (ruling that “[a]llegations of ‘assisting,’ ‘participating in,’ ‘complicity in’ and similar synonyms .
. . all fall within the prohibitive bar of Central Bank” and that a section 10(b) claim requires the defendant to have made a material misstatement or omission); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d
1215, 1223–27 & nn.7–12 (10th Cir. 1996) (ruling that in order for accountants to commit a primary
violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, “they must themselves make a false or misleading statement
(or omission)[,]” which requires more than providing significant or substantial assistance to another’s
misrepresentation).
53. Winkler v. NRD Mining, LTD, 198 F.R.D. 355, 364 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
54. In re Enron Corp., 235 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
55. See infra note 202.
56. SEC v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 708, 722, 724 (D.N.J. 2005). It is not entirely clear,
however, that an attorney acting in the traditional role of adviser and draftsperson to a securities issuer
would satisfy this standard. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 7, infra note 202, for a more detailed explanation of the standard.
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actors under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Taken as a synthesized whole,
the decisions make clear that the reliance element of a Rule 10b-5 claim
will not be satisfied in the absence of direct attribution of the statement to
the statement’s maker and that a person or entity does not make a statement at all without ultimate authority over the content and means of communicating the statement. The rules that emerge provide an increased level
of protection and certainty for securities lawyers who advise and counsel
securities issuers and make it less likely that such attorneys will be held
liable for securities fraud under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
1. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.
In the wake of the substantial disagreement over the meaning of Central Bank, the issue of scheme liability came before the Court in Stoneridge
when the lead plaintiff in the class action suit filed by investors, Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC, asserted that the defendants had engaged in a
scheme to misrepresent the revenue of the company in which Stoneridge
had invested.57 In Stoneridge, the Court held that entities who were both
customers and suppliers of a cable operator whose stock the plaintiffs had
purchased were not liable to the plaintiffs under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 for agreeing to certain arrangements with the cable operator that
permitted the cable operator to mislead its auditor and issue a misleading
financial statement that impacted the stock price.58 Charter Communica-

57. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 153, 159–60 (2008). In
its brief to the Supreme Court, Stoneridge Investment Partners argued that section 10(b) applies to
“those who defraud investors indirectly via a scheme.” Brief for Petitioner at 19, Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701941 at *19.
Stoneridge characterized the holding of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals as erroneously focused on
Rule 10b-5(b) and as “effectively nullifying Rule 10b-5(a) and (c).” Id. at 24, 2007 WL 1701941 at
*24.
Also, the petition for certiorari filed in Stoneridge specified that the issue in the case arose under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c). Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Stoneridge Inv. Partners,
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2006 WL 1909677 at *i. The Supreme Court, however, mentioned neither section in its discussion of the case. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at
152 (general reference to Rule 10b-5). The Court quoted the text of Rule 10b-5 in the opinion but
never specified whether its analysis was focused on any particular subsection of the rule. Id. at 156–57;
see also Columbo, supra note 18, at 87 n.210 (pointing out the reference to sections (a) and (c) of Rule
10b-5 in the petition for certiorari in Stoneridge and the Court’s failure to discuss those sections in the
text of the opinion); Robert John Grubb II, Attorneys, Accountants, and Bankers, Oh My! Primary
Liability for Secondary Actors in the Wake of Stoneridge, 62 VAND. L. REV. 275, 295 (2009) (characterizing the result in Stoneridge as “crippl[ing] plaintiffs’ ability to bring creative scheme-to-defraud
claims under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c).”).
58. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 152-53. One commentator described Stoneridge as “one of the most
contentious securities law decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court in recent
years[,]” and part of the reason for that was the understanding “that the Supreme Court’s decision
would impact accountants, lawyers, investment bankers, and the like . . . .” Franklin A. Gevurtz, Law
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tions, Inc., the cable operator, made an arrangement with its customers/suppliers, Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and Motorola, Inc., to overpay by
twenty dollars for each digital cable converter that Charter purchased from
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola during a certain time period.59 The arrangement required Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola to pay the twenty dollars back to Charter by purchasing advertising from Charter.60
In violation of generally accepted accounting principles, Charter recorded the advertising purchases from Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola as
revenue, thereby deceiving Charter’s auditor, Arthur Andersen, into approving a financial statement showing that it had met its projected numbers
on revenue and operating cash flow.61 The entities prepared legal documentation that made it appear as if the increased payments for the cable
boxes and the advertising purchases were unrelated, ordinary course of
business transactions, which prevented Arthur Andersen from uncovering
the link between the two.62 Scientific-Atlanta’s contract with Charter provided for a twenty dollar increase in the price of the cable boxes purchased
by Charter for the remainder of the year 2000, and Motorola’s contract
with Charter required Charter to purchase a specified number of cable boxes and to pay twenty dollars in liquidated damages for each unit that Charter did not accept.63 Both Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola sent the additional money from the cable boxes back to Charter by entering into contracts with Charter for the purchase of advertising time at a price exceeding
the fair value.64
The parties were careful to backdate the agreements for the purchase of
the cable boxes to create the appearance that the agreements were negotiated a month prior to the advertising agreements.65 The backdating was critical to creating the appearance that there was no connection between the
negotiations for the cable box purchases and the advertising purchases,
which was necessary for Arthur Andersen to treat the transactions separately.66 The advertising payments inflated Charter’s revenue and operating
cash flow by approximately seventeen million dollars, and the inflated

Upside Down: A Critical Essay on Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 103
N.W. U.L. REV. COLLOQUY 448, 448 (2009).
59. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 153–54.
60. Id. at 154.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 154–55.
65. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 155.
66. Id.
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number appeared on financial statements filed with the SEC and reported
to the public.67
Neither Scientific-Atlanta nor Motorola had any role in the preparation
or distribution of Charter’s financial statements, and both companies
booked the transactions as a wash on their own financial statements under
generally accepted accounting principles.68 A securities fraud class action
ensued under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 based on the allegations that
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola either knew about or recklessly disregarded Charter’s intention to inflate its revenues with these transactions, and
knew that research analysts and investors would rely upon the resulting
financial statements that Charter issued.69 The district court granted the
motion to dismiss of Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.70
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola were not liable to the
investors under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the investors had not
relied upon the acts or statements of Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola.71 To
establish liability in a private action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, it
is essential for the plaintiff to have relied upon the defendant’s deceptive
conduct.72 In addition, because neither Scientific-Atlanta nor Motorola had
a duty to disclose, nor were their deceptive acts communicated to the public under the fraud on the market doctrine, neither of these two rebuttable
presumptions of reliance applied.73 None of the investors had any
knowledge of the conduct of Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola and, there67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri ruled that the plaintiffs’
claims were barred by the Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), as claims for aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. MDL 1506, 4:02-CV-1186 CAS, 2004 WL
3826761, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2004). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit
affirmed, reasoning that liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 does not extend to “a business that
entered into an arm’s length non-securities transaction with an entity that then used the transaction to
publish false and misleading statements to its investors and analysts.” In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006).
71. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158–59.
72. Id. at 159.
73. Id. The fraud on the market theory presumes that most publicly available information about the
value of a security is reflected in the market price for the security, which means that an investor who
brings an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is presumed to have relied on “any public material
misrepresentations” about the security. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). The theory
is a recognition that although individual investors do not in all cases personally evaluate and analyze all
of the available information about a particular investment, false statements about the investment that
are made available to the general investing public adversely affect those investors because the investors
will trade in the security at a market price that is other than what it should be. CLARK, supra note 18, §
8.10.5, at 330.

File: Bishop Article

2012

Created on: 12/4/2012 8:30:00 PM

Last Printed: 12/11/2012 3:04:00 AM

ATTORNEY LIABILITY UNDER 10(B) AND RULE 10(B)-5

207

fore, any reliance on that conduct was “in an indirect chain . . . too remote
for liability.”74
Despite the absence of any public statement by either ScientificAtlanta or Motorola, Stoneridge sought to impose liability on them based
on scheme liability because they acted purposefully and “creat[ed] a false
appearance of material fact to further a scheme to misrepresent Charter’s
revenue.”75 Stoneridge argued that there was a sufficient causal link between the deceptive conduct of Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola and the
release of Charter’s inaccurate financial statements to the public to satisfy
the fraud on the market doctrine because Charter would not have been able
to deceive its auditor with the financial statements without the assistance of
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola.76 Noting that the reliance element of a
private action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is tied to the causation
element, the Court reasoned that the deceptive conduct of ScientificAtlanta and Motorola was too remote to satisfy the reliance requirement
because Charter misled the auditor and released the inaccurate financial
statements, and “nothing [Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola] did made it
necessary or inevitable for Charter to record the transactions as it did.” 77
As part of the rationale for its view that Stoneridge had failed to state a
viable claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Court characterized
the claim as an effort to apply a federal securities law cause of action to a
situation that is governed by state law, which is the sphere of business contracts for the purchase and sale of goods and services.78 The Court was
unwilling to expand the federal power associated with securities litigation
to an area with its own well-developed state law protections.79 Emphasizing the distinction between a federal securities law claim under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and a state law claim of common law fraud, the
Court stated that “[s]ection 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud
into federal law.”80
The Court also supported its ruling by reference to a provision of the
34 Act that was part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of

74. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159; see Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A DutyBased Approach to Reliance and Third Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125,
2129–38 (2010) (discussion and analysis of how the Court in Stoneridge made reliance the determinative issue in evaluating scheme liability).
75. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159–60.
76. Id. at 160.
77. Id. at 160–61.
78. Id. at 161. “Unconventional as the arrangement [between Charter and Scientific-Atlanta and
Motorola] was, it took place in the marketplace for goods and services, not in the investment sphere.”
Id. at 166.
79. Id. at 161.
80. Id. at 162.
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1995 (the PSLRA),81 a provision that authorized the SEC, and not private
parties, to bring enforcement actions against those who aid and abet violations of the federal securities laws.82 The Court reasoned that adoption of
Stoneridge’s view of primary liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
would revive the aiding and abetting cause of action against any party who
committed a deceptive act in the process of providing assistance to the
primary violator.83 The Court deferred to the judgment of Congress, as
expressed in § 104 of the PSLRA, that only the SEC had the authority to
bring actions against aiders and abettors.84
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that Charter could not have misstated
its revenue numbers without the “knowingly fraudulent actions of Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola” and that the investors relied upon those fraudu81. Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
82. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158, 162–63. The codifed provision of the PSLRA provides that in any
action brought by the SEC for either injunctive relief or monetary penalties, “any person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of [the 34 Act], or of any
rule or regulation issued [thereunder], shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same
extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.” 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006). Congress added
this provision to the 34 Act as part of the PSLRA, which was a set of amendments to various sections
of the federal securities laws. Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). Thus, Congress explicitly gave the SEC the power to bring enforcement actions against individuals who aid and abet violations of the securities laws, but Congress has never provided individuals with the power to bring private rights of action for such conduct. See SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., 155 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 1998)
(stating that enactment of Pub. L. No. 104-67 gives the SEC, and not private plaintiffs, the authority to
bring aiding and abetting actions under section 10(b)); Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169,
176 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that Congressional authorization of SEC enforcement action against those
who aid and abet securities law violations did not create a private cause of action for such conduct).
The SEC has utilized this power in enforcement actions. See SEC Sues Federal Loan Executives for
Fraud, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2011, at A1; Ex-Fannie and Freddie Chiefs Accused of Deception,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at B1. One of the claims for relief in this action is a claim for aiding and
abetting violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Complaint at 44–45, ¶¶ 128–33, SEC v. Syron,
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2011) (No. 11-Civ-9201).
83. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 162–63.
84. Id. at 163. The Court also supported its holding with reference to the history of the private right
of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, emphasizing that the action is a judicially created one
and not one that Congress enacted in the statutory text. Id. at 164. In the Court’s statement of the issue
before it in the first sentence of the opinion, the Court signaled the importance that it would place upon
the fact that the section 10(b) private right of action is not authorized in the statute itself: “We consider
the reach of the private right of action the Court has found implied in § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . and SEC Rule 10b-5 . . . .” Id. at 152 (emphasis added). Noting the concerns
associated with a judicially created private cause of action, the Court declined to further expand the
section 10(b) private cause of action. Id. at 164–65. In the Court’s view, any further expansion of the
section 10(b) private right of action should come from Congress, which is the body with the power to
control the availability of remedies under the federal statutes. Id. at 165. On July 30, 2009, approximately six months after the Court’s decision in Stoneridge, Senator Arlen Specter introduced a proposed amendment to section 20 of the 34 Act entitled “Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities
Violations Act of 2009.” S. 1551, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). The proposed bill would have allowed private individuals to bring civil actions against individuals who aid and abet violations of the
securities laws. Id. § (2). The Judiciary Committee never reported the bill to the full Senate for consideration. GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-1551 (last visited July
11, 2012); see Adams, supra note 9, at 972–73 (discussing proposed amendment to 34 Act).
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lent actions when they relied on Charter’s revenue statements to make their
investment decision.85 Justice Stevens viewed the conduct of ScientificAtlanta and Motorola as a deceptive device within the meaning of section
10(b), thereby satisfying the requirements of section 10(b) and taking the
case out of the Central Bank prohibition on aiding and abetting liability.86
Though deceptive, the conduct did not satisfy the reliance requirements of
a section 10(b) action because the defendants’ conduct was never communicated to the public.
2. The Landscape After Stoneridge
Approximately two months after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Stoneridge, where it reiterated the importance of the Central Bank Court’s
holding that secondary actors face liability under section 10(b) when they
engage in conduct that constitutes a primary violation of section 10(b), 87
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California in
Lopes v. Vieira88 denied a law firm’s motion to dismiss a section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 action brought against it in connection with alleged misstatements regarding the securities that were the subject of an offering memorandum prepared by the firm.89 The law firm argued for the dismissal because it had neither sold the securities nor made any of the statements in
the offering memorandum in that the statements were not directly attributed to the firm.90 The court discussed the concept of substantial participation in the preparation of the fraudulent statements as the basis for primary
liability of a secondary actor, but the denial of the motion to dismiss was
based on the court’s inability to resolve at the pleading stage whether the
law firm had any duty to the investors.91 The court analogized the attorney’s role in a securities offering to the role of an independent accountant,
which consists of conducting an independent investigation into the issuer’s
financial health and certifying the accuracy of the issuer’s financial statements, all of which may be relied upon by non-client investors.92 In the
court’s view, the law firm’s potential section 10(b) liability to the investors
would depend upon whether the law firm had a similar duty to non-client
investors.93
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 166.
543 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
Id. at 1178.
Id. at 1175–76.
Id. at 1177.
Id.
Id.
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Analogizing the attorney’s role in a securities offering to that of an accountant is questionable because of the attorney’s ethical duty not to disclose the client’s confidences94 and to provide advice to the client that is
generally not intended for the benefit of non-clients.95 Moreover, the decision in Lopes is inconsistent with the rationale for declining to impose liability on the cable operator’s customers/suppliers in Stoneridge: that the
deceptive conduct of the customers/suppliers was too remote from the cable operator’s issuance of the fraudulent financial statements to satisfy the
reliance element of an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.96 The
court in Lopes relied on the oft-quoted language from the Central Bank
decision regarding the liability of lawyers under Rule 10b-597 to support its
denial of the law firm’s motion to dismiss.98
When securities lawyers go beyond advising clients on securities law
compliance issues and drafting the offering documents for their clients, the
lawyer risks engaging in conduct that satisfies the elements of a section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation. In Thompson v. Paul,99 a case that was
argued two days after the Supreme Court’s decision in Stoneridge, which
was the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an
attorney who makes factual representations about an issuer to prospective
purchasers of the issuer’s securities has an obligation under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 to avoid making material misstatements or omissions about
the securities.100
In Thompson, attorneys representing a publicly traded company and
the CEO of the company in litigation between the company and the former
CFO, who had resigned, became aware that the CEO was a target of a
94. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2011) (defining confidentiality of information related to an attorney’s representation of a client).
95. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.3(a) (2011) (allowing a lawyer to evaluate a matter
affecting a client for the use of a third party “if the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer’s relationship with the client.”); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(2)–(4) (2000) (description of the
situations where a lawyer owes a duty of care to nonclients). One question is whether attorneys should
be treated differently from other defendants in securities fraud cases because of the unique duty of
confidentiality that attorneys owe to their clients. Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263,
272 (6th Cir. 1998) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
96. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 160–61 (2008).
That Stoneridge involved a claim of scheme liability and deceptive conduct under Rule 10b-5(a) and
(c), see supra note 55, and Lopes involved a claim of an untrue statement of fact in a written securities
offering document, Lopes, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1171, does not explain the inconsistency between the two
cases. In fact, the court in Lopes stated that the “recent Supreme Court opinion” in Stoneridge would
not alter the result in the case but provided no explanation of the distinction between the two cases
beyond a brief statement of the holding in Stoneridge. Id. at 1177–78.
97. See supra note 42 and accompanying text for the full quotation.
98. Lopes, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1177.
99. 547 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
100. Id. at 1063.
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criminal investigation with several federal agencies.101 In a settlement of
the litigation with the former CFO, a settlement that included the former
CFO’s receipt of common stock in the company, the attorneys represented
that there was no criminal investigation of the CEO.102 The court held that
section 10(b) imposes upon “[a]n attorney who undertakes to make representations to prospective purchasers of securities . . . an obligation . . . to
tell the truth about those securities.”103
The factual scenario in Thompson is clearly distinguishable from the
scenarios in Central Bank and Stoneridge. However, the case is a good
illustration of the imposition of primary liability on a secondary actor, a
lawyer, whose conduct satisfied the requirements for primary liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Thompson court’s rejection of the
attorneys’ argument that their representation of the securities issuer provided protection from liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5104 was
consistent with the ruling of Central Bank that any person, including an
attorney, may be primarily liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if all
of the requirements for primary liability are met.105
In a case that tacitly endorsed the explicit attribution requirement,106
while phrasing its decision in terms of the substantial participation test, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California held
that the plaintiffs met the heightened pleading standard for an allegation of
a materially misleading statement under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b)
against Berry, who was the vice president, general counsel, and corporate
secretary of the issuer.107 The plaintiffs alleged that Berry satisfied the
substantial participation test by drafting the issuer’s 2003 proxy statement
and signing her name to it and by signing her name to the issuer’s notes
registration statement, both of which contained false and misleading information.108 The plaintiffs’ allegation that Berry was substantially in101. Id. at 1057. The attorneys became aware of this information in connection with their representation of the company’s alter ego in another matter. Id.
102. Id. at 1057–58. The representation was in the form of an oral statement by one of the lawyers at
a settlement meeting. Id. at 1063.
103. Id. Section 10(b) imposes no duty on an attorney who becomes aware of an issuer’s fraudulent
misconduct to disclose the misconduct where the attorney has not provided an opinion or certified
statement on the matter or has not invited the investing public to rely on the laywer’s judgment. Wilson v. Dalene, 699 F. Supp. 2d 534, 548 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
104. Thompson, 547 F.3d at 1063.
105. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191; see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 184–89, 206–212 and accompanying text.
107. N.Y.C. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Berry, 616 F. Supp. 2d 987, 989, 994–95 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also
Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Robert W. Baird & Co., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1123, 1140–41 (D. Ariz. 2010)
(holding that plaintiff investors pled sufficient facts under the substantial participation test to place
responsibility for alleged omissions in the offering documents for the sale of revenue bonds upon two
law firms that prepared and drafted most of the language in the documents).
108. N.Y.C. Emps. Ret. Sys., 616 F. Supp. 2d at 993–95.
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volved in the preparation of other documents containing material misrepresentations was, standing alone, insufficient to satisfy the substantial participation test because the allegation failed to identify Berry’s specific role in
the preparation of the documents.109 The court also ruled that the plaintiffs
had successfully alleged a claim for scheme liability against Berry under
Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) for Berry’s conduct in coordinating a practice of
backdating the reported grant dates of the issuer’s stock options and disguising this practice through falsification of the issuer’s corporate records.110
By distinguishing the statements to which Berry signed her name from
those that did not identify Berry’s specific role in their preparation, the
court endorsed the notion that fraudulent statements must be explicitly
attributed to the issuer in order to satisfy the reliance requirement of a section 10(b) action. The court did not use the exact terminology, but it is
clear that substantial participation is not sufficient in the absence of explicit attribution.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Affco Invs.
2001, LLC v. Proskauer Rose, LLP111 endorsed the explicit attribution requirement and held that a law firm was not liable for participating in the
creation of a false statement or misstatement upon which investors relied
because the false statement or misstatement was not explicitly attributed to
the law firm at the time of its dissemination.112 In Affco Investments, an
accounting firm solicited the plaintiffs to participate in a tax avoidance
strategy and represented the strategy as a legitimate investment vehicle and
tax shelter.113 In order to market the tax strategy to potential investors, the
accounting firm “promised to provide independent opinions from several
major national law firms that had analyzed and approved the tax strategy.”114 The plaintiffs allege that the defendant law firm, Proskauer Rose,
LLP (Proskauer), worked with the accounting firm to prepare advance
109. Id. at 994–95.
110. Id. at 995–97. The court distinguished the conduct of Berry, which met the standard for actionable primary liability, from the non-actionable conduct of the customers/suppliers in Stoneridge, who
played no role in the cable operator’s dissemination of the false financial information. Id. at 997; see
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157, 160–61 (2008) (holding that the cable operator recorded transactions
falsely and released the financial information to the investing public, and the conduct of the customers/suppliers was never disclosed to the investing public.).
111. 625 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2010).
112. Id. at 193–95. The court in Affco Investments discussed the decision of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Pacific Investment Management and noted that it found the Second Circuit’s reasoning
persuasive. Id. at 194. See infra notes 184–216 for a complete discussion Pacific Investment Management. The plaintiffs in both cases failed to satisfy the reliance requirement of a 10b-5 action because
the statements at issue were not attributed to the defendant law firms.
113. Affco Invs.,625 F.3d at 188.
114. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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model legal opinions that vouched for the legitimacy of the tax scheme. 115
The plaintiffs agreed to invest in the tax strategy. 116 After consummation
of the necessary transactions, the plaintiffs claimed losses from the tax
scheme on their 2001 income tax returns but failed to report their participation in the scheme itself.117 An IRS investigation into the plaintiffs’ participation in an abusive tax shelter ensued, and the plaintiffs were required to
pay millions of dollars in back taxes, interest, and penalties.118
Similar to the argument made by the plaintiffs in Stoneridge, the plaintiffs in Affco Investments argued that Proskauer could be held liable for
participating in the creation of the false statement upon which the investors
relied even though the statement was not attributed to Proskauer when it
was disseminated.119 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument based on
its interpretation of Stoneridge that the investor must have knowledge of
the secondary actor’s conduct or statement in order for the investor to rely
on it and thereby satisfy the reliance element of a section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 action.120 The court then concluded that the reliance element of a
section 10(b) action is not satisfied in the absence of explicit attribution.121
The accounting firm’s advertisement of the tax scheme with support from
“major national law firms” made the case closer than it would have been
without the characterization, but it still failed to meet the requirement of
showing that the plaintiffs relied on Proskauer itself.122
The court said the following on the importance of attribution for the reliance element of a section 10(b) action:
Knowing the identity of the speaker is essential to show reliance
because a word of assurance is only as good as its giver. Clients
engage “name brand” law firms at premium prices because of the
security that comes from the general reputations of such firms for
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Affco Invs., 625 F.3d at 193–94.
120. Id. at 194.
121. Id.
122. Id. Subsequent to the plaintiffs’ participation in the tax scheme and consummation of the necessary transactions, the IRS issued two separate notices regarding certain prohibited transactions. Id. at
188. The plaintiffs became concerned about the effect of the notices on the tax scheme and sought tax
opinions from Proskauer, and Proskauer’s opinions concluded that the transactions in which the plaintiffs had engaged were not substantially similar to the prohibited transactions set out in the IRS notices.
Id. The plaintiffs’ decision to claim losses from the tax scheme on their 2001 tax returns and failure to
report their participation in the scheme itself was based on Proskauer’s advice. Affco Invs., 625 F.3d at
188. Because Proskauer rendered these opinions after the plaintiffs purchased their investment interests in the tax scheme, the opinions could not form the basis for liability under Rule 10b-5, as there was
no connection between the misrepresentation and the purchase of the investment interest. Id. at 195 n.7
(citing Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157).
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giving sound advice, or for winning trials. Specific attribution to a
reputable source also induces reliance because of the ability to
hold such a party responsible should things go awry.123
Although Proskauer was involved in the planning of the tax scheme,
the plaintiffs never made any allegation that they knew of Proskauer’s role
in it prior to making their investment.124 Without such knowledge, the
plaintiffs failed to satisfy the reliance requirement of their section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 claim against Proskauer.125 The attribution requirement
sets a clear boundary between primary violators, who are subject to section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability in actions brought by private parties, and
aiders and abettors, who are immune from private actions under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.126
In In re DVI, Inc. Securities Litigation,127 a case involving a scheme liability claim brought against a law firm under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) based
on the law firm’s advice to the issuer regarding necessary disclosures in a
10-Q, the court held that the plaintiff investors could not invoke the fraud
on the market presumption of reliance to impose liability on the law firm
where the law firm’s deceptive conduct was not publicly attributed to it. 128
The law firm advised the issuer not to release a prepared version of a 10-Q
that revealed material weaknesses in the issuer’s internal controls for monitoring non-performing assets and evaluating troubled loans.129 The version
of the 10-Q that was released did not discuss any material weaknesses in
the issuer’s internal controls.130 Citing both Stoneridge and the Second
Circuit’s decision in Pacific Investment Management Co. v. Mayer Brown
LLP131 with approval, the court in In re DVI reasoned that it is insufficient
for a plaintiff to demonstrate that a secondary actor’s deceptive conduct
123. Id. at 194.
124. Id. at 195.
125. Id.
126. Id. The court also questioned the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit regarding the attribution requirement in In re Mutual Funds Investment Litigation, 566 F.3d 111
(4th Cir. 2009). Affco Invs.,625 F.3d at 196 n. 8. The court distinguished the case sub judice from In
re Mutual Funds based on the Fourth Circuit’s limitation of its holding regarding the attribution standard to the fraud on the market context. Id. The court in Affco Investments expressed skepticism of the
Fourth Circuit’s standard and questioned whether, if faced with issue, it would adopt the same standard.
Id. The court’s uncertainty about the Fourth Circuit’s decision proved to be correct when the United
States Supreme Court reversed the In re Mutual Funds decision in Janus Capital Group Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 (2011). See infra notes 126–77 and accompanying text
(providing a discussion of the Janus decision, including the decisions at both the circuit court and
district court level.).
127. 639 F.3d 623 (3d Cir. 2011).
128. Id. at 642–43, 646–49.
129. Id. at 642.
130. Id.
131. See infra notes 184–216 and accompanying text.
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was publicly released through other statements or conduct if the public is
not aware of the secondary actor’s acts through explicit attribution.132
The preceding discussion demonstrates that even though some courts
continued to endorse and apply the substantial participation test that developed after the Central Bank decision, the courts either engaged in questionable reasoning or applied the test in situations where the attorneys acted outside the scope of their role of adviser and draftsperson. Requiring
the investor to have direct knowledge of the attorney’s role in the transaction in order to allege reliance on the attorney for purposes of a Rule 10b-5
action strikes the appropriate balance between protecting the investor and
adequately insulating the attorney from liability.
3. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders
In the span of one week, the Supreme Court made two significant decisions that expanded the protections for securities lawyers in the transactional and advisory setting. First, in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First
Derivatives Traders,133 the Court held that a mutual fund’s investment adviser did not make the material misstatements in the mutual fund’s prospectuses within the meaning of Rule 10b-5 and, therefore, was not liable
for the false statements under Rule 10b-5.134 Second, just one week after
the Janus decision was announced, the Court denied certiorari in Pacific
Investment Management, a Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision holding that a law firm was not liable under Rule 10b-5 for false statements that
the attorneys allegedly created where the false statements were not attributed to the lawyers at the time of dissemination.135
Although the Janus case did not directly address the issue of attorney
liability, its holding—“that the maker of a statement is the entity with authority over the content of the statement and whether and how to communicate it”136—provides a comfort zone to securities lawyers who are
involved in the preparation of various disclosure documents on behalf of
clients who are selling securities to the public. The denial of certiorari in
Pacific Investment Management provided confirmation of the implicit protection for lawyers in Janus, making clear that the failure to attribute an
132. In re DVI, Inc., 639 F.3d at 648.
133. 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2305 (2011).
134. Id. at 2305. The news media took an interest in the Janus decision. See Adam Liptak, In 5-4
Vote, Supreme Court Limits Securities Fraud Suits, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011, at B3; A Thwarted
Liability Scheme, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014
24052702303714704576383640212008736.html.
135. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 148, 152 (2d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 3021 (June 20, 2011).
136. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2303.
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allegedly false statement to a lawyer at the time of its dissemination precludes a plaintiff from establishing reliance on such statement.137 It also
served as a tacit endorsement of lower court decisions adopting the explicit
attribution requirement. A full discussion of the cases will elucidate their
combined significance to securities lawyers.
Janus Capital Group involved a family of mutual funds organized in a
Massachusetts business trust, the Janus Investment Fund (the Fund).138
Janus Capital Group, Inc. (JCG), a publicly traded company, created the
Fund, and the Fund retained JCG’s wholly owned subsidiary, Janus Capital
Management LLC (JCM), as its investment adviser.139 Investors acquired
ownership of all of the Fund’s assets by purchasing investment shares in
the Fund.140 The investment advisory services provided to the Fund by
JCM included the necessary management and administrative services for
the Fund to operate, but the Fund and JCM were independent legal entities.141 The officers were common to each one, but the members of the
respective boards of trustees were independent, as required by the relevant
provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the 40 Act).142
In compliance with the 40 Act, the Fund issued prospectuses to investors that described the investment strategy and operations of the various
individual mutual funds that comprised the Fund.143 The prospectuses for
several of these funds contained statements that could be interpreted to
mean that JCM would implement policies and procedures to limit the ability of the funds’ managers to engage in market timing, a practice that is
legal but harmful to other fund’s investors.144
In September of 2003, allegations against JCG and JCM of secret
agreements to permit market timing in several of the funds run by JCM
became known to the public, causing investors to withdraw significant
amounts of money from several of the individual funds.145 JCM’s management fee, which the Fund paid based on the total value of the funds,
comprised a significant percentage of JCG’s income.146 Thus, the Fund’s
loss in value also negatively impacted JCG’s value, and JCG’s stock price
fell approximately 25 percent in the month of September 2003.147 JCG
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Pac. Inv. Mgmt., 603 F.3d at 148.
Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2299.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2299–300.
Id. at 2300.
Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2300.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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stockholders filed a class action against JCG and JCM, bringing claims
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.148
The JCG stockholders alleged that the statements in the prospectuses
regarding the implementation of measures to curb market timing in the
funds were misleading and that JCG and JCM by causing the prospectuses
to be issued and made available to investors were responsible for the misleading impression.149 The plaintiffs further contended that JCG and JCM
had “materially misled” investors who relied upon the market price of JCG
securities as accurately reflecting all of the market information applicable
to JCG and JCM.150 The United States District Court for the District of
Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), based on the direct attribution requirement.151 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed.152
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case to resolve whether
JCM could be held liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for the false
statements in the prospectuses of the various individual mutual funds that

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2301.
151. Id. The District Court reasoned that in order to establish a defendant’s direct violation of the
federal securities laws, as opposed to non-actionable aiding and abetting, the misrepresentation must be
“directly attributable to the defendant.” In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d 618, 621 (D. Md.
2007). The District Court dismissed the complaint with respect to JCG because the complaint failed to
allege that any of the statements set forth in the prospectuses were directly attributable to JCG. Id. The
District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that JCG bore responsibility for the allegedly misleading
statements in the prospectuses based on the appearance of the Janus logo, name, and website on the
prospectuses. Id. The direct attribution rule will be discussed further in the text accompanying notes
184–89, 206–12, infra.
The District Court also dismissed the claim against JCM, reasoning that JCM owned no duty to the
shareholders of JCG because those shareholders never purchased shares in any of the individual mutual
funds that comprised the Fund. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 622–23. Therefore,
reasoned the District Court, there was “no nexus between the plaintiffs, as JCG shareholders, and JCM,
the funds’ investment adviser.” Id. at 623.
152. Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2301. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs had pled a section 10(b) primary liability claim against JCM that was sufficient to survive the
defendants’ motion to dismiss. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 2009). The
court ruled that JCM’s and JCG’s alleged participation in writing and disseminating the prospectuses
was sufficient to allege that JCM and JCG made the misleading statements. Id. at 121. Because the
allegedly misleading statements became public when they appeared in the funds’ prospectuses, the
plaintiffs satisfied the first part of the fraud on the market theory. Id. As for the second requirement of
the fraud on the market theory, that the allegedly misleading statements be sufficiently attributable to
the defendants, the court held that an interested investor with an understanding of a mutual fund’s
organizational structure would have inferred that JCM must have at least approved the statements in the
prospectuses regarding market timing even if JCM did not write the policies. Id. at 121, 126–27. The
court then ruled that the allegations of attribution were not sufficient to implicate JCG because it may
not have been apparent to an interested investor that the parent company of the investment adviser had
participated in drafting or approving the individual funds’ prospectuses. Id. at 127–28.
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comprised the Fund.153 Citing the language of Rule 10b-5 requiring a person “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact”154 in order to be
liable thereunder, the Court held that JCM was not liable because it had not
made the statements in the prospectuses that created the misleading impression regarding market timing.155 Echoing the Stoneridge Court’s concerns about the expansion of a judicially created private right of action,156
the Janus Court made clear that in analyzing the issue before it, it would be
cognizant of the fact that Congress neither authorized a private right of
action when it first enacted section 10(b) nor expanded the private right of
action when it amended the federal securities laws in 1995.157
The Court began its analysis of the issue with the noncontroversial assertion that “[o]ne ‘makes’ a statement by stating it.”158 Thus, reasoned the
Court, the person who makes a statement for purposes of Rule 10b-5 “is
the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its
content and whether and how to communicate it.”159 A person or entity
who has no authority or control over the statement or who prepares the
statement at the behest of another is not making the statement.160 Also, if a
statement is attributed to a party, either directly or by implication based on
the circumstances in which the statement was made, the attribution is a
strong indicator that the party to whom the statement was attributed made
the statement.161
In the Court’s view, the rule that it announced in Janus followed from
its holdings in both Central Bank and Stoneridge.162 To define persons or
entities without the ultimate control over a statement’s content as the makers of the statement would significantly undermine Central Bank’s prohibition on private rights of action against aiders and abettors of section 10(b)

153. Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2301. The petition for certiorari raised two issues with the
holding of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. First, JCM and JCG asserted that by allowing a private
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to proceed against a defendant that had not made a misstatement but had only helped to draft a misstatement made by another, the Fourth Circuit had authorized an aiding and abetting action in direct contravention of Central Bank. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-9, Janus Capital Grp., v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525), 2009
WL 3614467 at *8–9. Second, JCM and JCG asserted that the Fourth Circuit’s holding rejected the
rule in a majority of the other circuits requiring that a statement be directly attributed to a particular
defendant in order to invoke the presumption of reliance against that defendant under the fraud on the
market theory. Id. at 9, 2009 WL 3614467 at *9.
154. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2011).
155. Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2301.
156. See supra note 84.
157. Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2301–02.
158. Id. at 2302.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2302–03.
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and Rule 10b-5 violations,163 because such a broad definition of “maker”
would render aiders and abettors almost nonexistent.164 In addition, the
dismissal of the action in Stoneridge because of the absence of investors’
reliance on the equipment suppliers’ undisclosed deceptive conduct, conduct that did not in any way necessitate the cable operator’s recording of
inflated revenue numbers on its financial statements,165 was the precursor
to a rule that one must have authority over the content of a statement in
order to have made that statement.166 The lack of such authority negates
the inevitability to the statement setting forth any falsehood.167
The Court rejected the government’s argument that a person or entity
that creates a statement should be regarded as the maker of the statement
for purposes of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability.168 Adoption of such
a broad definition of “make” would run counter to the holding in Stoneridge, reasoned the Court, that entities involved in deceptive transactions
were not liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 even when information
about the deceptive transactions was subsequently included in false statements that were made public.169 The Court equated the participation in the
drafting of a false statement with the engagement in deceptive transactions
“when each is merely an undisclosed act preceding the decision of an independent entity to make a public statement.”170
The Court also rejected the argument that the uniquely close relationship between mutual funds and their investment advisers necessarily means
that the investment adviser is the maker of any statements by the mutual
fund.171 The Court acknowledged the “significant influence” of investment
advisers over their mutual fund clients but declined to disregard the fact
that JCM and the Fund are “legally separate entities.”172 The imposition of
liability on the investment adviser based solely on its close relationship
with the mutual funds that it advises would, in the Court’s view, create a
theory of liability that was inconsistent with the Stoneridge decision.173
Thus, as the entity with the statutory obligation to file the prospectuses
with the SEC, the Fund, and not JCM, made the statements in the Fund’s
prospectuses.174 In addition, nothing in the prospectuses indicated that
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177, 191; see supra notes 5, 29–31 and accompanying text.
Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159–61; see supra notes 56–76 and accompanying text.
Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2303.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2303–04.
Id. at 2304.
Id.
Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2304.
Id.
Id.

File: Bishop Article

220

Created on: 12/4/2012 8:30:00 PM

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 12/11/2012 3:04:00 AM

Vol. 10 No. 2

JCM made any of the statements set out therein.175 Despite any assistance
that JCM may have provided to the Fund in preparing the prospectuses,
JCM did not make the statements in the prospectuses within the meaning
of Rule 10b-5.176
The dissenting opinion took issue with the majority’s interpretation of
the word “make” as limited in scope “to those with ultimate authority over
a statement’s content.”177 The dissent also argued that neither the English
language nor the Court’s relevant precedent supported the majority’s position.178 The dissent distinguished Central Bank, a case dealing with
whether liability could be imposed on an entity that aided and abetted the
primary violator,179 from the case before it, which dealt with imposition of
liability on the primary violator that was alleged to have made statements
within the meaning of Rule 10b-5.180 The dissent also distinguished Stoneridge, where the Court dismissed the action not because the equipment
suppliers had failed to make any false statements, but rather because the
investors had not relied on those statements,181 from the case before it that
dealt with whether one or more persons had made statements that were part
of the public securities markets and upon which investors relied.182
The dissent argued that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient
to reach the conclusion that JCM made the false statements in the prospectuses.183 The dissent cited to examples of individuals facing primary liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when those individuals did not have
ultimate control over the issued statements or when they made the statements through innocent persons acting as conduits.184 Ultimately, the close
relationship between JCM and the Fund compelled the dissent to conclude
that JCM was sufficiently involved in the preparation and writing of the
175. Id. at 2305.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2307.
179. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177, 191; see supra notes 5, 29–31 and accompanying text.
180. Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2307–08 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
181. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159–61; see supra notes 57–77 and accompanying text.
182. Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2308–09 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 2311. The dissent relied in part on Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 377,
386–87 (1983), where the Court held that purchasers of registered securities who were allegedly defrauded by misrepresentations in the registration statement could maintain an action under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 despite the existence of an express remedy for the alleged fraud in section 11 of the ’33
Act. The Court in Herman & MacLean pointed out that individuals other than those listed in section 11
of the ’33 Act as subject to liability for misrepresentations in the registration statement may engage in
fraud in the preparation of the registration statement, which would exempt those individuals from any
liability for such fraud if they were beyond the reach of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. at 689 n.22.
Thus, the dissent reasoned, those individuals who participated in the preparation of the registration
statement would be deemed to have made the statements therein for purposes of § 10(b) and Rule 10b5. Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
184. Janus Capital Grp., 131 S. Ct. at 2311–12 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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allegedly false statements to subject it to a claim of primary liability under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.185
4. Pacific Investment Management Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP
One week after Janus was decided, the next significant decision in this
area was Pacific Investment Management, where the Supreme Court denied certiorari from a Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision that held a
law firm was not liable under Rule 10b-5 for false statements that the attorneys allegedly created where the false statements were not attributed to
the lawyers at the time of dissemination.186 The denial of the petition for
certiorari was not a decision on the merits of the case,187 and this article’s
analysis of recent developments in the law governing attorney liability
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 does not suggest otherwise. Because
of the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction, however, at least one commentator has suggested: “[I]f [certiorari denials] are treated as hints of courses
not fully charted, they can be used to develop new approaches and to give
the careful observer some evidence of how the Justices, as individuals,
have analyzed a problem in the past.”188 Thus, the Court’s denial of the
certiorari petition in Pacific Investment Management may be a hint of the
Court’s approach to this issue and may provide some evidence of the Justices’ thinking on it. That the certiorari denial came one week after the
Court’s decision in Janus reinforces that view.
In Pacific Investment Management, the absence of attribution precluded the plaintiffs, who purchased securities during the period of the law
firm’s alleged fraud,189 from demonstrating that they relied on the law
185. Id. at 2312.
186. Pac. Inv. Mgmt., Co., 603 F.3d at 148, 152, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3021 (2011). The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York had previously granted the law firm’s
motion to dismiss the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim against it based on the lack of attribution of
the statements in the documents at issue to the law firm. In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d
304, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). To hold the law firm liable in the absence of attribution would circumvent
the reliance requirement of a claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. at 314. The court similarly
rejected the plaintiffs’ alternate theory of liability, also known as scheme liability, under Rule 10b-5(a)
and (c) because of the plaintiff’s lack of reliance on the law firm’s conduct. Id. at 314–19.
187; see Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 226 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (affirming the lower
court’s refusal to grant a writ of habeas corpus and stating that a denial of certiorari “has no legal
significance whatever bearing on the merits of the claim.”). Justice Frankfurter expressed a similar
view in another case where the Court denied the petition for certiorari:
Inasmuch, therefore, as all that a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari means is that
fewer than four members of the Court thought it should be granted, this Court has rigorously
insisted that such a denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court’s
views on the merits of a case which it has declined to review.
Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950).
188. Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1229 (1979).
189. 603 F.3d at 150.
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firm’s own false statements.190 To the extent that the law firm had participated in the creation of the statements at issue, the conduct “amount[ed], at
most, to aiding and abetting securities fraud.”191
The litigation in Pacific Investment Management arose out of the collapse of a large brokerage firm, Refco, Inc.192 The defendant in the case,
Mayer Brown LLP, was Refco’s primary outside counsel from 1994 until
the company collapsed in 2005.193 Part of Refco’s business involved lending money to its customers so that the customers could then trade in securities with the borrowed money, a process known as trading on “margin.”194
When these Refco customers incurred significant losses from their securities trading in the late 1990s, the customers did not have the money to repay hundreds of millions of dollars of margin loans that Refco had extended them.195 Refco became concerned that an accurate accounting for these
debts as “write-offs” would jeopardize the company’s existence and, allegedly with Mayer Brown’s assistance, arranged a series of bogus transactions with the goal of concealing the losses.196
The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that Refco transferred the uncollectible debts to another Refco entity, Refco Group Holdings, Inc. (RGHI), and
RGHI sent back to Refco a receivable that it purportedly owed to Refco. 197
In order to avoid the suspicion associated with having a large debt owed to
it by a related entity, Refco then engaged in a series of circular and fraudulent loan transactions with RGHI and various third parties to make it appear as if the third parties, and not RGHI, owed receivables to Refco.198
The plaintiffs also alleged that Mayer Brown was involved in a number of
these transactions over a five-year period by “negotiating the terms of the
loans, drafting and revising the documents relating to the loans, transmitting the documents to the participants, and retaining custody of and distributing the executed copies of the documents.”199
In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that Mayer Brown was responsible
for false or misleading statements in a Refco offering memorandum and
190. Id. at 148.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 148–49.
193. Id. at 149.
194. Pac. Inv. Mgmt., Co., 603 F.3d at 149.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. The specific allegations were that after transferring the uncollectible debts to RGHI in exchange for the receivable from RGHI, Refco then indirectly loaned RGHI the money to pay off Refco’s
receivable by first lending the money to third parties, who would then lend the money to RGHI to pay
off the receivable. Id. At the close of the fiscal period, all of the loans were repaid, and the third parties received a fee for participating in the scheme. Pac. Inv. Mgmt., Co., 603 F.3d at 149.
199. Id.
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two Refco registration statements.200 The failure of each of the documents
to describe accurately Refco’s financial condition that had been partially
obfuscated by the fraudulent loan transactions was the basis for the assertion that the documents contained false or misleading statements.201 Furthermore, Mayer Brown was directly involved in the preparation of the
documents through drafting sections of certain documents, reviewing and
revising sections of others, and reviewing comment letters from the SEC
on one of the registration statements.202 The offering memorandum and
one of the registration statements disclosed that Mayer Brown represented
Refco on the transactions, but none of the documents directly attributed
any of the information in the documents to Mayer Brown.203
The plaintiffs argued that the absence of attribution of the statements to
Mayer Brown did not preclude the imposition of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 liability upon Mayer Brown because the firm had created a false
statement upon which the investors had relied.204 The court rejected the
creator standard for liability of secondary actors, reasoning that it was essentially identical to the standard that imposed liability on actors who
played a significant role in drafting or reviewing a fraudulent statement or
who were intricately involved in the process.205 As the Second Circuit had
previously rejected that significant role standard,206 it similarly rejected the
creator standard.207
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 149–50.
203. Pac. Inv. Mgmt., Co., 603 F.3d at 150. For a discussion of the District Court’s reliance on the
lack of attribution in the court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims, see supra note 184 and accompanying text.
204. Pac. Inv. Mgmt., Co., 603 F.3d at 151, 154–55. In an amicus curiae brief, the SEC also urged
the court to adopt a standard that would impose liability on parties for creating false statements. Id.;
see Brief of Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Amicus Curiae, in Support of the Position of Plaintiffs-Appellants
on the Issue Addressed and in Support of Neither Affirmance Nor Reversal, Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v.
Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1619-cv), 2009 WL 7768584, at *7. In the
SEC’s view, a person creates a statement for purposes of Rule 10b-5 liability if the person writes or
speaks the statement, provides false or misleading information to another person for placement into the
statement, or allows the statement to be attributed to him or her. Id. The SEC has previously argued
for the adoption of this standard. See Brief of the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n as Amicus Curiae at 9, Klein
v. Boyd, Fed. Sec. Law. Rep. ¶ 90,136 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 1998), vacated and rehearing en banc granted,
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4121 (3d Cir. Mar. 9, 1998) (Nos. 97-1143; 97-1261) (“A person who creates a
misrepresentation, but who takes care not to be identified publicly with it, ‘indirectly’ uses or employs
a deceptive device or contrivance and should be liable.”).
205. Pac. Inv. Mgmt., Co., 603 F.3d at 155–56.
206. See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 174–75 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the court’s
adherence to a test requiring a party to actually make a material misstatement or omission to incur
primary liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as opposed to a test imposing liability on parties
who significantly participate in the creation of a statement made by another party).
207. Pac. Inv. Mgmt., Co., 603 F.3d at 155–56. The court went on to express concern that “a creator
standard would be even less rigorous than” a standard that required a defendant’s substantial participa-
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After reviewing the history of the attribution requirement in the second
circuit, the court concluded that secondary actors such as Mayer Brown are
not liable in a private action for Rule 10b-5 securities fraud in the absence
of attribution.208 The court relied on Central Bank’s prohibition on aiding
and abetting liability, reasoning that a secondary actor who assists or participates in the making of a material misstatement or omission under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, even if that assistance or participation is substantial, has merely aided and abetted the misleading statement and has not
actually made it.209
The requirement that the false statement be attributed to the defendant
at the time of dissemination in order to hold the defendant liable was based
on the reliance requirement for an action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b5.210 In the absence of attribution, a plaintiff would be seeking to impose
liability on a defendant for a representation made by another party, which
would not satisfy the reliance requirement of an action under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.211
In the court’s view, the attribution requirement was also consistent
with the reasoning that resulted in the Supreme Court’s rejection of the
plaintiffs’ claims in Stoneridge that were based on the plaintiffs’ reliance
on the financial statements issued by Charter Communications, Inc., the
cable operator, and not on the deceptive conduct of the defendants, Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and Motorola, Inc., who were both customers and suppliers of Charter.212 In addition, the attribution requirement established a
distinct boundary between primary violators of section 10(b) and Rule 10b5 and aiders and abettors.213 The ease with which trial courts are able to
apply the attribution requirement avoids protracted and expensive litigation
and discovery, and it also brings a degree of certainty and predictability to
securities law.214
tion because the creator standard could potentially impose liability on a defendant “for almost any
involvement in the creation of false statements.” Id. at 156 & n.4 (alteration in original).
208. Id. at 152.
209. Pac. Inv. Mgmt., Co., 603 F.3d at 153,
210. Id.
211. Id.; see Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 180 (reasoning that imposing Rule 10b-5 liability on an aider
and abettor would be the equivalent of allowing the plaintiff to hold the defendant liable with no showing of reliance on the defendant’s own statements or actions); Wright, 152 F.3d at 175 (“[A] secondary
actor cannot incur primary liability under the [34] Act for a statement not attributed to that actor at the
time of its dissemination [because s]uch a holding would circumvent the reliance requirements of the
[34] Act . . . .”); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Reliance
only on representations made by others cannot itself form the basis of [section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5]
liability.”).
212. Pac. Inv. Mgmt., Co., 603 F.3d at 155–56; see supra notes 58, 71–77 and accompanying text for
a discussion of this aspect of the Stoneridge decision.
213. Pac. Inv. Mgmt., Co., 603 F.3d at 156–57.
214. Id. at 157.
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The court also relied on Stoneridge in affirming the District Court’s
dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against Mayer Brown under Rule 10b-5(a)
and 10b-5(c).215 The allegation that Mayer Brown’s participation in Refco’s fraudulent loan transactions allowed Refco to hide its true financial
condition from investors was analogous, in the court’s view, to the allegations of the defendants in Stoneridge that the defendants’ deceptive conduct allowed the cable operator to issue a misleading financial statement.216
The plaintiffs’ lack of awareness of Mayer Brown’s conduct at the time
they purchased the Refco securities negated any claim that the plaintiffs
relied on Mayer Brown’s conduct in making the purchase.217 In addition,
with approval, the court quoted the District Court’s observation that “unlike in Stoneridge, ‘the Mayer Brown Defendants were not even the counter-party to the fraudulent transactions; they merely participated in drafting
the documents to effect those transactions.’”218
The fact that a defrauded investor will not satisfy the reliance element
of a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 action unless an alleged fraudulent
statement is directly attributed to the statement’s maker or the alleged deceptive conduct is directly communicated to the investor, certainly shrinks
the pool of potential defendants in such actions. The pool becomes even
smaller when the narrow definition of a maker of a statement for purposes
of Rule 10b-5 is considered: “the person or entity with ultimate authority
over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it”.219 An attorney who counsels a securities issuer by providing
legal advice and drafting disclosure documents does not have ultimate authority over the contents of the statement and the means of communicating
it.220 Providing attorneys with a higher degree of protection from liability
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 does not place investors in the securities markets at greater risk. It simply means that a defrauded investor must
bring a Rule 10b-5 action against the party who made the fraudulent statement or engaged in the fraudulent conduct in connection with the particular
securities transaction.
In fact, the equilibrium has swung back to the point where the Court in
Central Bank intended to bring it when it prohibited the imposition of aiding and abetting liability in a private action under section 10(b) and Rule
215. Id. at 158; see supra note 184.
216. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 603 F.3d at 158–59; see supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
217. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 603 F.3d at 159.
218. Id. at 160 (quoting In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d at 316.
219. Janus Capital Group, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
220. See HAFT AND HUDSON, supra note 25; cf. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir.
2008) (holding that section 10(b) imposes upon an “[a]n attorney who undertakes to make representations to prospective purchasers of securities . . . an obligation . . . to tell the truth about those securities”).
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10b-5.221 Under Central Bank, primary liability under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 depends upon satisfaction of the requirements for such liability
and not upon the alleged violator’s status or occupation.222 A person or
entity who substantially participates in the creation of a fraudulent statement or who engages in conduct that is not communicated to investors has
not satisfied those requirements, just as a person who aids and abets a Rule
10b-5 violation has not satisfied those requirements.
III. SEEKING GUIDANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES
The prior discussion points out that there has been considerable disagreement on the proper standard for assessing liability of secondary actors,
including attorneys, under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Even though the
law has moved toward clarifying this standard, perhaps an additional way
to find some common ground is to examine how other areas of the law
have addressed the issue of attorney liability. This discussion will make
clear that it is possible to distinguish between actionable attorney conduct
and non-actionable attorney conduct in a way that permits plaintiffs to recover without unduly expanding the category of defendants.
This discussion is not intended to suggest that the 34 Act should simply adopt one or more of the standards presented from these other areas.
Though somewhat related, these are distinct bodies of law with their own
unique issues and nuances. The intent is merely to provide some relevant
information that will cultivate discourse on this issue.
This section first discusses how the 33 Act has addressed the issue.223
Next, it discusses how states with securities laws that are analogous to the
33 Act and the 34 Act have addressed the issue.224 Also, the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) has an interesting and instructive history on whether attorneys who collect debts, either through litigation or
through traditional debt collection methods, fall within the scope of the

221. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177, 191; see supra notes 29–44 and accompanying text.
222. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
223. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
224. This methodology has support in the Central Bank decision. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 178
(examining the express causes of action in the 33 Act and the 34 Act as a guide for determining the
scope of the cause of action under section 10(b)). For a detailed and thorough comparison of section
12(2) of the 33 Act to Rule 10b-5, see Martin I. Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under
Section 12(2) and How it Compares with Rule 10b-5, 13 HOUS. L. REV. 231 (1976). Section 12 of the
33 Act previously consisted of subsections (1) and (2) until an amendment to the act in 1995 designated
those subsections as part of subsection (a) and added a subsection (b). Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, ch. 15, sec. 77i, § 105(1)–(3), 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
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FDCPA.225 For that reason, a discussion of that portion of the FDCPA is
set forth after the discussion of the 33 Act and the state securities laws.
A. Section 12 of the 1933 Act and Lawyer Liability
The 33 Act226 regulates an issuer’s initial distribution of securities by
requiring detailed disclosures in registration statements and prospectuses in
order to prevent overly aggressive sales tactics and overpriced securities
issuances.227 As one court described it, “[t]he design of the statute is to
protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions.”228 The emphasis of the 33 Act
on ensuring that potential investors have adequate and truthful information
about issuers’ securities offerings has been described as reflecting “a philosophy of full disclosure rather than . . . an ideal of substantive regulation.”229
Section 12(a)(2) of the 33 Act, which expressly authorizes a private
cause of action, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Any person who . . . offers or sells a security . . . by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material
fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading . . . shall be liable . . . to the person purchasing such security from him . . . .230
In addition, section 12(a)(1) of the 33 Act imposes liability on a person
who offers or sells a security in the absence of an effective registration
statement or who distributes a prospectus relating to any security unless the
prospectus sets out the information required by the 33 Act.231 Section 12
of the 33 Act applies only to public offerings of securities and not to private transactions.232

225. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006).
226. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006).
227. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 171; Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 727–28, 752–53.
228. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
229. CLARK, supra note 18, at 719–20.
230. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)(2) (2006).
231. Id. § 77(a)(1).
232. Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2001); see Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,
580–81 (1995) (discussing the legislative history of the 33 Act, which provided that section 12 protects
those who purchase securities that are covered by a registration statement).
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Both section 10(b) of the 34 Act and Rule 10b-5 provide that “[i]t shall
be unlawful for any person” to engage in the conduct proscribed by the
statute and the rule,233 respectively, but the standards in sections 12(a)(1)
and 12(a)(2) of the 33 Act are limited to “‘[a]ny person who . . . offers or
sells a security . . . .’”234 In Pinter v. Dahl,235 the United States Supreme
Court defined the term “seller” in section 12(a)(1) of the 33 Act in a matter
involving investment in an oil and gas venture by an initial investor and
subsequent purchases of participating interests in the venture by individuals who learned of the opportunity from the initial investor.236 In Pinter,
Dahl, the initial investor, told the other investors about the venture after he
invested his own money, and he assisted the investors in completing the
subscription agreement form that was prepared by the securities dealer,
Pinter, from whom the interests were purchased.237 Dahl did not receive a
commission from Pinter for the purchases made by the other investors. 238
Each agreement stated that the participating interests had not been registered under the 33 Act.239
The Supreme Court defined a seller of securities under section 12 of
the 33 Act as one who passes title to the buyer for value or one who solicits
securities purchases for his or her own financial benefit or for the financial
benefit of the securities owner.240 The Court declined to adopt the substantial factor test espoused by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, which included in the definition of seller those persons “whose
participation in the buy-sell transaction [was] a substantial factor in causing the transaction to take place.”241 The Court rejected the substantial
factor test because an evaluation of whether a person should be categorized
as a seller under the test is not grounded in the statutory language. 242 Even
though application of the test would, in many situations, encompass those
who pass title or who solicit securities purchases, it would also impose
233. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2011).
234. Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011, 1017 (2d Cir. 1989).
235. 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
236. Id. at 625–26, 641–47 (1988).
237. Id. at 625–26.
238. Id. at 626.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 642, 646–47. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Dahl was
not a seller of the securities under section 12 of the 33 Act because even though he was a substantial
factor in causing the other investors to purchase the participating interests from Pinter, Dahl did not
benefit financially from his efforts. Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985, 990–91 (5th Cir. 1986); see Fisch,
supra note 43, at 1303 n. 67 (suggesting that courts could use the Pinter analysis and predicate primary
liability under section 10(b), at least in part, on whether the defendant has a financial interest in the
fraudulent transaction).
241. Pinter, 486 U.S. at 648–49 (quoting Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1980)).
242. Id. at 651.
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liability on individuals with an insignificant connection to the important
aspects of the sales transaction.243
The Court then elaborated on this observation in language that has relevance to the issue of attorney liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5:
“Indeed, it might expose securities professionals, such as accountants and
lawyers, whose involvement is only the performance of their professional
services, to section 12(1) strict liability for rescission. The buyer does not,
in any meaningful sense, ‘purchas[e] the security from’ such a person.”244
The lack of meaningful guidelines in the substantial factor test for determining the appropriate level of involvement in a transaction to qualify
someone as a seller means that decisions utilizing the test are made on a
case by case basis, making it difficult for those engaged in securities transactions to comply with the statutory requirements.245
Six months after the Court’s decision in Pinter, in a case involving a
bond offering in which the bond purchasers ultimately lost millions of dollars when the bond issuer went into bankruptcy, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had the opportunity to decide whether the law
firm that represented the underwriters of the bond issue was a “seller” under section 12(2) of the 33 Act.246 Reasoning that the plaintiffs in the case
had purchased bonds from brokers, previous owners, and perhaps even
from the underwriters, the court held that that the law firm was not a “seller” under section 12(2) of the 33 Act because none of the plaintiffs had
purchased bonds from the law firm that assisted in the preparation of the
offering statement.247 The court relied on the reasoning of the Pinter decision, despite the fact that Pinter dealt with the definition of “seller” under
section 12(1) of the 33 Act as opposed to section 12(2) and even quoted
with approval the language from Pinter regarding exposure of lawyers to
liability under section 12.248

243. Id.
244. Id. (emphasis added).
245. Id. at 652.
246. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1109, 1113–15 (5th Cir. 1988).
247. Id. at 1114–15.
248. Id. at 1115; see supra note 242 and accompanying text. As the Abell case was decided six years
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank, the plaintiffs in Abell also brought an aiding and
abetting claim under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against the law firm. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1123–24,
1126–28. The law firm knew that the SEC was investigating one of its clients for securities violations
and that both the original underwriter’s counsel and original bond counsel had resigned from their
representations, and it also made several material changes to the final bond offering statement with
investigating the reasons for the changes. Id. at 1127. The court concluded that the law firm may have
recklessly disregarded its duties to its clients and ignored indications that certain aspects of the bond
offering were improper, but the conduct did not rise to the level of the necessary intent to violate the
securities laws as an aider and abettor. Id. at 1128.
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In a more recent action brought under section 12(a)(2) by investors in a
fraudulent scheme against the lawyers who drafted the false and misleading prospectuses and other promotional materials for the investment, the
court held that the investors failed to state a section 12(a)(2) claim against
the lawyers.249 The court dismissed the claim because of the investors’
failure to allege that the lawyers had participated at all in soliciting the
purchases of the securities.250 The allegation was merely that the lawyers
had “performed their professional services in their . . . capacit[y] as . . .
lawyers.”251 Drafting documents such as an offering memorandum, even
when the memorandum is used as part of the strategy to solicit investments, is “merely the performance of professional services” and does not
subject the drafting attorney to liability under section 12(a)(2).252
Thus, the 33 Act has clearly shielded lawyers from primary liability
when lawyers provide advice to securities issuers and draft documents such
as offering materials on behalf of such issuers. Numerous district court
decisions have followed this line of reasoning.253 This shield provided to
attorneys by the 33 Act is based on the same rationale as both the attribution requirement that a defrauded investor must meet in order to satisfy the
reliance element of a Rule 10b-5 action and the narrow definition of a
maker of a statement for purposes of Rule 10b-5.254 An attorney who is
acting in the role of legal representative of an issuer of securities by drafting documents and providing advice to the issuer is not a seller of securities under sections 12(a)(1) and 12(a)(2) of the 33 Act nor does that attorney have the ultimate authority over the contents or the means of communicating any statement made by the issuer in connection with the sale of
the securities under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The 33 Act and the 34
Act provide slightly different paths to the same destination for securities
249. Lopes v. Vieira, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1171 (quoting Rocchio v. Eagle Mission, Inc., No. 91-56111, 1993 WL 51193, at *2 (9th
Cir. Feb. 26, 1993)).
253. See, e.g., Sassoon v. Altgelt, 777, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1303, 1305–06 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (ruling that
attorneys representing issuer of securities and acting in their role of legal representative of the issuer
did not offer or sell a security to the plaintiffs within the meaning of section 12(2) of the 33 Act);
Scholes v. Stone, McGuire and Benjamin, 786 F. Supp. 1385, 1399 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (ruling that attorneys who participated in the sales transaction and played a role in leading the investor plaintiffs to
purchase securities were not sellers under section 12(2) of the 33 Act because the attorneys neither
passed title to the securities nor solicited the purchase of the securities); Sellin v. Rx Plus, Inc., 730 F.
Supp. 1289, 1291–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (ruling that law firm that drafted a private placement memorandum used in an allegedly fraudulent sale of securities was not liable under section 12 of the 33 Act in
the absence of any evidence that the law firm was involved in the solicitation of the plaintiffs’ purchase
of the stock).
254. Janus Capital Group, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011). A maker of a statement for purposes of
Rule 10b-5 is “the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and
whether and how to communicate it.” Id.
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lawyers, and the destination is the ability to fulfill the role of attorney to
the fullest without fear of liability for a statement or conduct for which the
attorney is, at best, secondarily responsible.
The notion that attorneys who are not selling securities when performing professional services in connection with a securities sales transaction,
does not provide attorneys with an outright exemption from liability under
section 12 of the 33 Act. An attorney who plays an active role in the sales
transaction may be liable as a seller under section 12, and the courts have
demonstrated a willingness to impose liability on attorneys whose conduct
moves beyond providing professional services and into the realm of acting
as a seller of securities.255 The important point, which is also true of the
analysis under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, is to examine the conduct
itself and not the title or the status of the person engaged in the conduct.
B. Attorney Exemptions Outside of the Federal Securities Laws
1. State Securities Laws
Another possible resolution to this issue is for Congress to provide
lawyers with an outright statutory exemption from liability or, in the alternative, protection from liability in the performance of ordinary professional
services such as advising securities issuers and drafting disclosure documents on behalf of issuers. Some state securities laws provide such exemptions or protections and could serve as models for revisions to the federal securities laws 256 The statutes enacted in Arizona and Ohio are discussed below as examples.257
The Arizona statute provides that a civil action may be brought in connection with a sale of securities “against any person, including any dealer,
salesman or agent, who made, participated in or induced the unlawful sale
255. See, e.g., Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1360 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that an attorney who
attempted to persuade shareholders to purchase stock pursuant to a merger and who made representations at a shareholders’ meeting regarding the feasibility of a merger was not a passive adviser but an
active negotiator in the transaction, bringing the attorney within the scope of the seller definition of
section 12(2) of the 33 Act); Koehler v. Pulvers, 606 F. Supp. 164, 166, 169 (S.D. Cal. 1985) (holding
that issues of material fact existed as to the extent of the securities issuer’s attorney’s involvement in
fraudulent business practices, fraudulent concealment, and misrepresentations and omissions in the sale
of securities, thereby precluding grant of summary judgment on section 12(2) claim against the attorney).
256. Every state has a statute in place to protect investors against the fraudulent offering and sale of
securities. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 27.02 (2d ed. 2003). The state
statutes are referred to as “blue sky laws” because they protect unsuspecting investors against issuers
“having nothing behind their securities but water or blue sky.” Id.
257. For a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the issue of attorney liability under the state
securities laws, see Mark I. Steinberg & Chris Claassen, Attorney Liability Under the State Securities
Laws: Landscapes and Minefields, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2005).
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or purchase [of securities],” but that a person shall not be “deemed to have
participated in any sale or purchase solely by reason of having acted in the
ordinary course of that person’s professional capacity in connection with
that sale or purchase.”258 The Arizona statute does not explicitly provide
an exemption for lawyers, but the non-participatory status that it confers
upon an individual who is performing professional services in connection
with a securities purchase certainly provides a degree of protection to the
securities lawyer. An attorney who deviates from the professional role of
adviser and draftsperson risks liability under the Arizona statute because
the statute exempts conduct and not attorneys or any other classification of
persons.259
The Ohio statute is a good example of a statute providing an exemption to the attorney. It prevents “[a]ny attorney, accountant, or engineer
whose performance is incidental to the practice of the person’s profession”
from being deemed to have caused, taken part in or assisted the seller in
any way in selling or agreeing to sell a security in violation of the statute.260 An attorney who prepares documents for the securities transaction
as well as counsels and advises his clients in connection with the transaction is “acting as legal counsel, and not as [a] sales [person]” and, therefore, is immune from liability for securities fraud under the Ohio statute.261
The Ohio statute codifies the principle that the case law interpreting
the 33 Act has developed which is that attorneys who draft documents for,
counsel, and advise securities issuers are not selling securities. Even as the
Ohio statute seems to exempt attorneys from liability for securities fraud,
the statute still defines the exemption in terms of the attorney’s specific
conduct. The statute recognizes that transactions in securities require the
extensive involvement of attorneys and other secondary actors and that
such actors should not face liability as sellers of such securities for doing
nothing more than practicing their respective professions.
2. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)262 provides another
example of a statutory scheme that had to address the issue of attorney
liability. Congress passed the FDCPA in 1977 as an amendment to the
Consumer Credit Protection Act in an effort to prohibit abusive practices
258. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44–2003(A) (2012) (West).
259. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
260. OHIO. REV. CODE. ANN. § 1707.431(A) (West 2011–2012).
261. McCartney v. Universal Electr. Power Corp., No. 22417, 2005 WL 2020559, at *2 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2005).
262. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2006).
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by debt collectors.263 The Congressional findings and declaration of purpose in the statute state that “[a]busive debt collection practices contribute
to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of
jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy” and that “[e]xisting laws and
procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.”264 As originally passed in 1977, the statute exempted attorneys from
its operation by providing that the term “debt collector” did not include
“any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the
name of the client . . . .”265 A 1986 amendment to the FDCPA removed the
exclusion for attorneys.266
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
whether attorneys who regularly collect debts, either through litigation or
through traditional debt collection methods, fall within the scope of the
FDCPA.267 The statutory definition of “debt collector” was inconclusive,268 and the specific statutory exclusions no longer mentioned attorneys.269 In an interesting use of legislative history, the Court reviewed
Congress’s previous exclusion of attorneys from the definition of debt collector and subsequent removal of that exclusion, and concluded that the
FDCPA applied to attorneys.270
The Court based its conclusion on the statutory definition of debt collector as any person who “regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly
or indirectly, [consumer] debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due
another.”271 The ordinary meaning of that definition would include lawyers who regularly try to obtain payment of consumer debts through legal
proceedings.272 The Court also relied on the repeal of the exemption for
lawyers in 1986 and the absence of a “narrower, litigation-related, exemption to fill the void.”273
Congress removed the attorney exemption from the FDCPA to close a
loophole in the statute that allowed persons engaged in traditional debt
collection activities to escape the requirements of the FDCPA simply because they had a law degree.274 Elimination of the attorney exemption was
not intended to include within the purview of the term “debt collector”
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95–109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977).
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)–(b) (2006).
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95–109, 91 Stat. 874, 875 (1977).
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, ch. 15, sec. 1692, § 803(6), 100 Stat. 768 (1986).
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995).
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2006).
Id. § 1692a(6)(A)–(F).
Heintz, 514 U.S. at 294–95.
Id. at 294; See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
Heintz, 514 U.S. at 294.
Id. at 294–95.
Firemen’s Ins. Co. v. Keating, 753 F. Supp. 1137, 1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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those attorneys providing legal advice and counsel to clients.275 Analogously, the Supreme Court’s statement in Central Bank that lawyers are
not exempt from liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was not intended to impose liability on lawyers engaged in providing legal advice
and drafting documents on behalf of issuers.
IV. SECURITY FOR THE SECURITIES LAWYER
A. The Lawyer’s Role
The highly competitive environment in which lawyers operate requires
them to market their services and areas of expertise aggressively.276 A
general survey of the web pages of some large, national law firms reveals
that lawyers describe themselves as possessing various talents and abilities
in an effort to attract clients.277 It is interesting to review these law firms’
275. Id. “‘Attorneys or law firms that engage in traditional debt collection activities (sending dunning letters, making collection calls to consumers) are covered by the FDCPA, but those whose practice
is limited to legal activities are not covered.’” Id. at 1143 (quoting Statements of General Policy or
Interpretation Staff Commentary On the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097 (Dec.
13, 1988)). See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hartel, 741 F. Supp. 1139, 1139–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(holding that law firm “engaged in activities only of a purely legal nature” when it represented an
insurance company seeking reimbursement for payments made on promissory notes that it had guaranteed on behalf of an investor in a limited partnership); In re Cooper, 253 B.R. 286, 294 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 2000) (no liability imposed upon a law firm under the FDCPA where the law firm provided a legal
defense to the debt collector but engaged in no debt collection activity itself).
276. Printed or published advertising by lawyers is protected speech under the commercial speech
doctrine. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 644, 646 (1985) (holding that
restrictions on attorney advertising were not narrowly crafted and would undermine First Amendment
commercial speech protections if allowed to stand); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202, 205–07 (1982)
(holding that the state could not constitutionally discipline an attorney for deviating from certain government imposed advertising restrictions if the advertisement was truthful and neither deceptive nor
inherently likely to deceive); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 368–79 (1977) (rejecting each of the
arguments offered in support of a state bar prohibition on the newspaper publication of two attorneys’
truthful advertisement and holding the prohibition unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment); see also Gary M. Bishop, Corporate Speech and the Right of Response in the Commercial Free
Zone, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1149, 1170–76 (discussion of application of the commercial speech doctrine
to attorney advertising).
277. E.g., BAKER & MCKENZIE, http://www.bakermckenzie.com/aboutus/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2012)
(“We understand the challenges of the global economy because we have been at the forefront of its
evolution.”); BINGHAM, http://www.bingham.com/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (phrases, which are
accompanied by clever, attention-grabbing photographs, such as “Legal Insight. Business Instinct.”
“Navigate the Titanic Challenges of Today’s Global Financial Markets.” “Is the SEC Scrutinizing
You?” “The tougher the deal, the more we enjoy it.” “Legal obstacles: creative counsel finds a way.”);
CRAVATH, SWAINE AND MOORE, LLP, http://www.cravath.com/philosophy/ (last visited Nov. 15,
2011) (describing the firm’s attorneys as possessing the following qualities: “intelligence, creativity,
work ethic and a desire to excel.”); DLA PIPER, http://www.dlapiper.com/global/
about/everythingmatters/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (“Nothing is beyond our reach. In terms of client
service, everything matters.”) (emphasis in original); GIBSON DUNN, http://www.gibsondunn.com/
story/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (“IF THE ANSWER CAN’T BE SEEN, we ask the
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descriptions in light of the developments in the law of attorney liability
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as previously discussed. The standard
has moved toward providing a greater level of protection for lawyers. Defrauded investors who seek to impose liability on the issuer’s lawyers will
have a more difficult task in demonstrating that the lawyer is the maker of
the statement and that the investor relied on the statement. Thus, in ensuring their clients’ compliance with the securities laws, securities lawyers
now have a greater level of certainty as to the standard for their own compliance.
It is important, however, for attorneys to remain in the traditional role
of planning, advising, drafting documents, and commenting upon documents for their clients who are selling securities. Adherence to that role
provides lawyers with the greatest unlikelihood of making a material misstatement or omission on which a purchaser or seller of securities will rely.278 Such avoidance will, in turn, minimize the risk of exposure to primary liability under Rule 10b-5.
In one commentator’s view, “only the Enron scandal halted another
development that had begun and was gathering momentum: The rise of
multi-disciplinary professional firms that practiced law along with other
professions such as accounting or consulting.”279 Such a development undoubtedly has given rise to new scenarios involving attorney conduct that
the recent developments discussed in this article do not address. As it now
stands, the risk of Rule 10b-5 liability for securities lawyers whose business is securities transactions should not discourage lawyers from marketing themselves as possessing “business instinct,”280 as being “creative,”281
or as being capable of providing ideas that are not “preconceived” or “off
the shelf.”282 Attorneys can provide services that meet these standards and
still remain well within the bounds of conduct that does not rise to the level
of securities fraud. The explicit attribution requirement and the narrow
definition of a maker of a statement for purposes of Rule 10b-5 ensure that

question in a different way.”); GOODWIN PROCTOR, http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Our-Firm.aspx
(last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (describing the firm’s attorneys as “nimble, creative and pragmatic . . .
business-oriented . . . [and] prepared to do what it takes to defend and protect [the firm’s] clients’
interests.”); MILBANK, http://www.milbank.com/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (“Clients don’t come to
us for preconceived, off-the-shelf ideas.”).
278. See SEC Rule 10b–5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2012).
279. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 196
(2006).
280. BINGHAM, http://www.bingham.com/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
281. Id.; CRAVATH, SWAINE AND MOORE, LLP, http://www.cravath.com/philosophy/ (last visited
Nov. 15, 2011); GOODWIN PROCTOR, http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Our-Firm.aspx (last visited
Nov. 15, 2011).
282. MILBANK, http://www.milbank.com/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
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securities lawyers can practice at a high level and avoid Rule 10b-5 liability for fulfilling their professional obligations.
B. Defining 10b-5 Liability in Terms of Conduct
It is vitally important for securities lawyers to limit themselves to advising securities issuers, drafting and preparing disclosure documents for
the issuers, and to refrain from acting as agents of the issuers in the sale of
securities. The former role is much less likely to bring the lawyer into
conflict with section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and the latter role presents significant challenges for the lawyer in attempting to avoid such conflict.283
One important way that securities lawyers who represent issuers can protect themselves from imposition of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liabilities
is to avoid direct contact and communication with potential investors in the
issuer’s securities.284
Providing an increased level of protection to securities lawyers does
not undermine the 34 Act’s power to deter and prevent fraud in the securities markets and to ensure the complete disclosure of material information
for investment decisions.285 As the Court in Central Bank made clear, sec283. See Bailey v. Trenam Simmons, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye & O'Neill, P.A., 938 F. Supp.
825, 828–29 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that law firm must do more than provide standard legal services
to the seller of securities in order to be subject to liability as an agent of the seller under the Florida
state securities law); Klein v. Boyd, 949 F. Supp. 280, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (interpreting definition of
agent in Pennsylvania state securities laws and determining that a lawyer acting in traditional roles of
advising and preparing documents is not an agent attempting to aid in the sale of securities).
284. See Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that section 10(b) imposes
upon an “[a]n attorney who undertakes to make representations to prospective purchasers of securities .
. . an obligation . . . to tell the truth about those securities.”); Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143
F.3d 263, 265, 267 (6th Cir. 1998) (reversing district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims where
attorney representing issuer spoke directly with potential investors in the issuer and revealed material
details about the proposed investment without revealing additional facts that were necessary to make
his statements not misleading); Trust Co. of Louisiana v. N.N.P. Inc., 104 F.3d 1478, 1481–83, 1490
(5th Cir. 1997) (attorney who agreed to act as custodian for certain Government National Mortgage
Association Certificates (“GNMA’s”) for various investors had knowledge that the underlying securities transactions were not backed by any interest in the GNMA’s and wrote letters to imply that he held
the GNMA’s in custody made a material misrepresentation within the meaning of Rule 10b-5); Kline v.
First W. Gov’t Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 481, 487–90 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether plaintiff investors were reasonable in relying on a law firm’s opinion
letters concerning the tax consequences of the investments), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1032 (1994);
Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 843, 848 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that attorney could not evade
Rule 10b–5 liability where he wrote an opinion letter on the tax benefits of an investment and authorized the investment’s promoters to include the letter in the offering materials).
285. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986) (describing 34 Act’s purpose of deterring
fraud and ensuring full disclosure). But see Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 222–23 (2003) (arguing that the “elimination of private suits for aiding
and abetting dismantled one of the only working methods of regulating corporate lawyers and deterring
bad conduct by members of this elite and powerful section of the bar” because actions against lawyers
as primary violators of the securities laws are very difficult to make).
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ondary actors such as lawyers face liability under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 when their conduct satisfies the standard for primary liability.286 An
interpretation of the liability standard under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
that requires an allegedly false or misleading statement to be attributed to
the maker—and that narrowly defines the maker of the statement as the
person with ultimate authority over it—is consistent with the deterrence of
fraud and complete disclosure of information in the securities markets.
A clear, narrow, and well defined standard for attorney liability will
encourage attorneys to counsel securities issuers on the proper disclosure
standards and to become more involved in assuring that securities issuers
are in compliance with the federal securities laws. It seems clear that the
imposition of liability based on the substantial participation standard will
discourage lawyers from participating, which will have a negative impact
on the securities markets as a whole.287 Moreover, “an award of damages
under the securities laws is not the way to blaze the trail toward improved
ethical standards in the legal . . . profession[].”288
In addition to protecting those who invest in securities, which is of the
utmost importance, and the securities lawyers who counsel and advise the
issuers of those securities, which is the group with which this article is
principally concerned:
[I]t must be kept in mind that the nation’s welfare depends upon
the maintenance of a viable, vigorous business community . . . .
Without further delineation [of the standard for civil liability under
Rule 10b-5], civil liability is formless, and the area of proscribed
activity could become so great that the beneficial aspects of the
rule would not warrant the proscription.289
The negative consequences of imposing civil liability on securities
lawyers for performing their professional obligations outweigh the benefits.
V.CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s rulings in Stoneridge and Janus and its subsequent denial of certiorari in PIMCO are most likely an endorsement of the
286. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
288. Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986).
289. Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 91 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804–05 (5th Cir. 1970).
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bright line test and a rejection of the substantial participation test for the
determination of liability of secondary actors under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. These rulings are of great significance for securities lawyers who
represent securities issuers. These lawyers do not function as advocates in
the way that litigators and trial lawyers do. Rather, they are technicians
who strive to ensure that their clients comply with the federal securities
laws. As these lawyers advise their clients, draft documents on their behalf, and plan and structure transactions, the work is more effective if it is
conducted without the overriding concern that the attorney’s participation
in the work will ultimately lead to becoming a defendant in a securities
fraud action. That outcome is justified only if the attorney commits the
securities fraud and independently meets the relevant standard.
Without the attribution requirement, a defrauded investor who brings a
Rule 10b-5 action against the attorney who represents the issuer is simply
suing the wrong defendant. The person with ultimate authority over the
statement bears the responsibility, and it is incumbent upon courts that
interpret and apply section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to recognize that fact.

